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Times of war place considerable stress on civil liberties, especially
ones protected by the First Amendment. When the nation must gather
itself to fight an enemy who is intent on killing us, it is perhaps only
natural that our tolerance for the usual disorder of dissent will decline.
When everyone has to sacrifice for the common good, when fellow
citizens are dying in that cause, the costs of speech are visible and serious. Dissent may dissuade or discourage soldiers from fighting; sowing doubt may weaken resolve just when it's needed most; falsehoods
and misinformation may lead to catastrophic shifts of policy; and the
enemy's perceptions of a divided society may well strengthen its determination to fight on, with still more injury and loss of life on the
battlefield. Wars, moreover, always bring a sense of heightened urgency that leads the ideals of rational and deliberative debate to acquire an air of na'vet6. Action, not deliberation, becomes the imperative. In this way, the rationale for an "exception" to freedom of speech
in times of war emerges.
Yet, it is widely thought (certainly by those who study and defend
civil liberties) that the nation persistently loses a proper respect for
civil liberties during these times of national crisis.' A panic sets in; a
mob mentality takes hold, which exaggerates the danger from speech,
looks for scapegoats for our fears and rage, and inflicts a trail of
t President, Columbia University. It bears noting that Professor Stone and I coedited a
book on the First Amendment. Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone, eds, Eternally Vigilant:
FreeSpeech in the Modern Era (Chicago 2002).
1 See Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: US. Disregardfor InternationalLaw in the
World War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians-A Case Study, 40 BC L Rev 275, 297 (1998)
(calling "times of war or other perceived crisis" the "times that our civil liberties are most easily
lost"); Skinner v Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 US 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall dissenting) ("History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when
constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.").
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shameful persecution. The victims of these excesses are usually the
weakest and least influential members of the society, although at
times even some of the most powerful are not entirely immune. The
government may see political advantages, too, in stirring up intolerance, while such an agitated environment can also be useful in settling
scores and shoring up one's political base. Most of all, however, excessive intolerance threatens to eviscerate serious public debate about
critically important public issues.
Invariably these periods of excess are followed, once the danger
passes, by a condemnation of what has occurred and a stated determination not to let such excesses happen again. The postwar period is
filled with regrets, apologies, clemencies, pardons, all accompanied by
promises that we'll do better next time. But the bad behavior has all
the elements of an addiction. It is a story of chronic recidivism, of violations followed by pleas for forgiveness, followed by a new situation
that is always thought to bear no resemblance to past periods of
transgression. Every war seems different from the last. The enemy
seems to be more clever and to possess new tactics and capacities. Our
success seems more in doubt.
Dissent, therefore, always seems more dangerous and costly than
it was the time before. Thus, while the maxim of war is that generals
are forever making the mistake of thinking the new war is just like the
last war, the maxim of free speech in wartime is just the reversesociety is forever making the mistake of thinking the new war is fundamentally different from all prior wars.
Geoffrey Stone's book, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime,
From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism, shows how this

has occurred at least six times in U.S. history. He analyzes each episode: the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the Civil War, World War I,
World War II, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. And Stone concludes by asking whether we, in the war against terrorism, can do any
better. The story of censorship, when told in this fashion, should instill
in all of us a sense of alarm that First Amendment freedoms are still
not safe against the tempestuous emotions of war. It is easier, Stone
reminds us, "to look back on past crises and find our predecessors
Stone's book is replete with examples. The brunt of these excesses falls on persons like
the copy editor of a German-language newspaper in Missouri (p 195), or a handful of anarchist
emigrants from Russia (p 203). See Frohwerk v United States, 249 US 204 (1919) (unanimously
affirming a copy editor's conviction under the Espionage Act for conspiring to cause disloyalty,
mutiny, and refusal of duty in the United States military forces); Abrams v United States, 250 US
616 (1919) (affirming a group of anarchists' convictions under the Espionage Act).
3 For example, Eugene Debs, the leader of the Socialist Party in the United States and a
presidential candidate, was notoriously prosecuted and sent to jail for speaking approvingly of
those who resisted the draft during World War I. See Debs v United States, 249 US 211 (1919).
2
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wanting than to make wise judgments when we ourselves are in the
eye of the storm" (p 557). And Stone is the perfect person to tell the
tale.
As the Harry Kalven, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor at the
University of Chicago Law School (where he was also dean and provost), Stone bears the mantle of one of the great, and eloquent, figures
in the modern history of freedom of speech. All of us who are First
Amendment scholars who came of age in the late 1960s wished to be
Harry Kalven.' Stone comes closest, not just in title but in intellectual
style, to the perspective of Harry Kalven.' This is a perspective that
believes in developing a coherent doctrinal architecture that serves
relatively simple but still profound fundamental values, such as that of
self-government. It sees the virtues of legal institutions providing bulwarks against the natural bad impulses that both arise from democracy in action and simultaneously mar democracy if unchecked. It sees
the benefits of vigorous public discussion. It is concerned that punishing and deterring intemperate speech might "chill" desirable speech,
and this concern often takes precedence over laws that protect other
goods from harmful speech (for example, reputation or national security). Geoffrey Stone speaks from this vantage point in Perilous Times.
Interspersed throughout the tales of intolerance, Stone develops
significant themes that have not been illuminated before in the literature on freedom of speech. Experiences of the twentieth century have
taught us that courts and juries do not serve as adequate bulwarks
against the rising tides of suppression of speech in times of war.'
Nearly everyone, including judges, seems swept up in the emotional
need to separate the world into those who are for the cause and those
who are against it. But Stone finds something intriguing about judges
in these moments, something reminiscent of the remarkable theme
Robert Cover explored in his book on how northern antislavery
judges interpreted the Fugitive Slave Act.7 The thesis is this: faced with
deciding cases under legislation judges believe is immoral or wrong,
4
Harry Kalven, Jr., wrote numerous books and articles on the First Amendment, but
perhaps the best known and influential was The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup Ct Rev 191, 193-94 (arguing that the Supreme
Court's decision in New York Times v Sullivan was its "best and most important .. ever produced in the realm of freedom of speech").
5 See, for a single example, Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, eds, The FirstAmendment (Aspen 2d
ed 2003).
6
See, for example, Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214 (1944); Debs, 249 US 211.
7 Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 6-7 (Yale 1975).
Cover examines how several "antislavery" judges in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
interpreted and enforced the Fugitive Slave Act strictly, despite their own moral and conscientious objections to slavery.
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judges will rigidly invoke their official obligation to enforce the "law"
and actually overlook or ignore reasonable interpretations of that
law that would moderate its harmful impact. So too, Stone finds,

judges in the national hysteria during World War I interpreted the Espionage Act of 19178 in less speech-protective ways than was reasonably required (pp 158, 170-73). One court, not at all uncommon in its
interpretation, read the act to cover a speaker saying "government is
for the profiteers" to the Women's Dining Club of Kansas City-all
because the statement had a tendency to "chill enthusiasm, extinguish
confidence, and retard cooperation" among the women attending
(p 171-72).'
Another notable theme in Perilous Times is the varieties of censorship utilized, which extend far beyond the classic approach of passing legislation prohibiting speech. John Stuart Mill observed long ago
that nonlegal forms of censorship are at least as effective as direct
legal means in suppressing speech.'° Stone makes the point graphically,
in each of the six narratives." But of greater interest and importance is
Stone's illustration of how intolerance can be driven by the interaction
of national leaders (such as the president and the attorney general)
and the public. For example, Stone shows how effectively Lincoln's
restraint in using censorship during the Civil War "played a critical
role in keeping repression in check" (p 133). On the other hand, President Wilson and his administration unfortunately chose a different
path and made an atmosphere of intolerance significantly worse. The
Wilson administration, Stone writes, "needed to create an 'outraged
public' in order to arouse Americans to enlist, contribute money, and
make the many other sacrifices war demands" (p 153). The administra8 40 Stat 217.
9 United States v Stokes, (unreported) (D Mo 1918), revd, 264 F 18 (8th Cir 1920), quoted
in Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 52-53 (Harvard 1941).
10 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 93 (Penguin 1985) (first published 1859). Mill describes
these nonlegal forms of censorship:
For a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties [restricting thought and discussion] is that they strengthen the social stigma. It is that social stigma which is really effective, and so effective is it that the profession of opinions which are under the ban of society
is much less common in England than is, in many other countries, the avowal of those which
incur risk of judicial punishment.
11 For example, Stone cites strong pressure for political conformity in academia in the
1950s. Hundreds of professors were fired for "their actual or suspected, past or present, membership in the Communist Party" (p 422). Furthermore, the aura of conformity on campuses left
students, as Stone explains, frightened to voice liberal views, or to become identified with peace
or free speech because such views had become "associated with Communism" (p 422). To Stone,
this form of nonlegal censorship "inhibits debate where it most needs to be uninhibited" (p 422),
because an educated public and open dialogue about free speech allows the marketplace of ideas
to function at its best (p 536-37).
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tion's actions "led to one of the most fiercely repressive periods in
American history" (p 153). Wilson himself spoke publicly, in a Flag
Day address, of the "sinister intrigue" lurking throughout the country
and of German "agents in the United States 'in places high and low"'
(p 153). One of the more infamous and revealing official comments of
the period came from Attorney General Thomas Gregory, who said of
opponents of the war, "May God have mercy on them, for they need
expect none from an outraged people and an avenging government"
(p 153).
These observations on the interplay between government and the
public in influencing the degree of respect for civil liberties raise one
of the more interesting questions posed by Stone's analyses of the six
episodes-just how far should the First Amendment go in protecting
dissent from government suppression? For example, Stone explains
how Wilson established the Committee on Public Information (CPI)
to create public support for the government's war policies (p 153).
Stone then observes that while "the government is free to tell its own
side of the story and to attempt to promote a sense of national unity
and commitment to the war effort," the "question raised by the activities of the CPI is how far the government should go in this effort"
(p 153-54). He does not completely dismiss the idea that this might
become, under extraordinary circumstances, a First Amendment question: "It would have to be a very extreme case to imagine a court holding that the government's own speech violates the First Amendment
because it has, in effect, swamped the marketplace of ideas" (p 154).
Nevertheless, "as a matter of sound governance," he argues, we should
develop a national understanding of the limits of "government advocacy of its own policies" (p 154).
Perilous Times also makes us more sensitive to just how protean
the censorship impulse is. Government officials "have proved insistently creative in pursuing their ends" of censorship, Stone states in
conclusion (p 525). So,
when the government "loses" one means of controlling dissent, it
quickly finds others to replace it. When direct criminal prosecution of dissidents became more difficult after World War II, the
government promptly turned to loyalty tests and legislative investigations to deny dissenters employment and expose them to
public harassment and humiliation. When those means of suppressing dissent came into question, the government expanded its
use of surveillance and disruption to intimidate and silence its
critics. When those techniques of managing dissent were challenged, the government moved more aggressively to control information and to deny citizens access to knowledge about the activities of their own government (p 525).
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At the very least, this observation about the government's almost
Darwinian ability to adapt means that over this century the very scope
of the First Amendment-that is, what we take to be within its purview-is likely to change and to expand if we remain intent on protecting public debate to the extent we have in the latter part of this
past century.
On the other hand, Stone is not pessimistic about the prospects
for improvement. He disagrees with those who argue that "once constitutional rights are compromised, they are lost forever" (p 530).
Rather, Stone demonstrates that for each period he chronicles, "the
nation's commitment to free speech rebounded, usually rather quickly,
sometimes more robustly than before" (p 530).12 An optimistic note is

also struck in one of Stone's more original insights: just how much
Congress has kept in mind, even in wartime, "its constitutional responsibilities" (p 541)."3 At the time of the Sedition Act of 1798," and

on similar occasions, "Congress-proceeding without any Supreme
Court guidance--took seriously" the constitutional interests at stake
(p 541). For example, during the debate over the Espionage Act of
1917, Congress "took its constitutional responsibilities quite seriously
and expressly rejected several key provisions proposed by the Wilson
administration" (p 146). (The press censorship provision, for example,
would have criminalized the publication of material that the president
deemed "of such character that it is or might be useful to the enemy";
despite heavy pressure from the White House, Congress rejected this
provision (pp 147-49).) Unfortunately, the "administration and the
federal courts distorted the ... Act in order to suppress a broad range

of political dissent" (p 146). This sad story of censorship throughout

12 Compare Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture:
What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 Const Commen 261,286-87 (2002):
[W]e add the more general point that restrictions of civil liberties that came to be regretted
after the war were never again repeated. No President has ever repeated Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, his military trials for civilians in the United States, or his
brutal suppression of newspapers. We have never again seen loyalty prosecutions as in
World War I, and we are unlikely to do so. The same is true of the World War II exclusion of
Japanese-Americans.
13 See also David P Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The FederalistPeriod,1789-1801
296 (Chicago 1997). Currie argues that during the Federalist Period, "Congress and the executive
resolved a breathtaking variety of constitutional issues great and small, left us a legacy of penetrating and provocative constitutional arguments, and developed a sophisticated glossary of the
meaning of a whole host of constitutional provisions." Id. Although Congress did pass the Alien
and Sedition Acts, the Republicans, in their opposition to the Acts, "gave us all that really matters in our modem theory of free expression-the indispensability of speech to the political
process and the marketplace of ideas." Id at 297.
14 1 Stat 596.
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our history naturally leads the reader to ask what might be done to
improve on this record in the future.
I think we have to start with the possibility that we already have
improved significantly and certain things that have been done are
working beneficially and should continue to be emphasized. Perilous
Times reminds us that not until 1919 was there any significant judicial
interpretation and application of the First Amendment and that
not until that year was there a single Supreme Court case involving
the principle of free speech."5 Since then, of course, we have had an
enormous jurisprudential development of free speech doctrine and
thought, culminating in the Court's extraordinarily speech-protective
decisions, primarily
in the 1960s, which remain the governing prece16
dents to this day.
The question to be asked, then, is whether this is a transformation

of historic dimensions or another quixotic tilting at intolerance. It
seems to me significant that someone of Stone's knowledge and judgment believes in a positive transformation. Of course, he says, there "is
no 'end' to this story," but there is progress (p 525). Thus, the Court
"has learned over time that it is impossible to excise from public debate only those views that are thought to be 'dangerous,' without undermining free speech more generally" (p 524). It now understands
the roots and manifestations of intolerance, and Brandenburgv Ohio7

"represents the (contemporary) culmination of this process" of steadily increasing awareness (p 524). Having constructed a "'fortress'
around core political speech," Brandenburg is, as "Harry Kalven has
said... 'the perfect ending to a long story!"' 8 (p 524).

Of course, we are in wartime now, and so we have one more ex-

perience to add to the list that Stone explores in depth. In the last few
pages of Perilous Times, Stone considers how well we as a society have

15 See, for example, Daniel Farber, Lincoln's Constitution 171-72 (Chicago 2003) (noting
that "the Supreme Court did not seriously confront First Amendment issues until ... World War I
and its aftermath"). The major cases that year were Schenck v United States, 249 US 47 (1919)
(upholding the defendants' convictions under the Espionage Act for circulating a pamphlet
criticizing the draft); Frohwerk,249 US 204; and Debs, 249 US 211.
16 See, for example, New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 280 (1964) (holding that the
First Amendment does not permit criminal or civil sanctions for false statements made about
public figures without a showing of "actual malice"); Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School District,393 US 503 (1969) (holding that schools may not prohibit students from
wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War); Cohen v California,403 US 14,26 (1971) (holding that, under the First Amendment, the "simple public display" of a certain "four-letter expletive" as a protest against the military draft may not be criminalized).
17 395 US 444, 447 (1969) (holding that even speech advocating the use of force or violations of the law is protected by the First Amendment unless such speech "is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
18 Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America 232 (Harper &
Row 1988).
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done during "the war on terrorism" (p 550). He begins with praise for
President Bush for "his response to the risk of hostile public reactions
against Muslims and Muslim Americans" (p 551). Bush has done better than Wilson (with respect to German Americans) or Roosevelt
(with respect to Japanese Americans). Stone proceeds to note that
"there have been no federal criminal prosecutions of any individuals
for criticizing the administration's policies against terrorism" (p 551).
This, too, is a "far cry" from what has occurred in earlier wars. This is a
genuine sign of progress, Stone asserts. Whereas Eugene Debs was
prosecuted for praising draft resisters during WWI, it is "unthinkable"
that Howard Dean might today be prosecuted for opposing the war in
Iraq (p 551).
But Stone criticizes the Bush administration for associating dissent with disloyalty, for exploiting citizens' fears for political advantage, and for some abridgements of civil liberties during this period.
On the last charge, his list is chilling:
The more questionable restrictions included indefinite detention,
with no access to judicial review, of more than a thousand noncitizens who were lawfully in the United States and had not been
charged with any crime; blanket secrecy concerning the identity
of these detainees; refusal to permit many of these detainees to
communicate with an attorney; an unprecedented assertion of
authority to eavesdrop on constitutionally protected attorneyclient communications; secret deportation proceedings; the incarceration for more than two years of an American citizen, arrested
on American soil, incommunicado, with no access to a lawyer,
solely on the basis of an executive determination that he was an
"enemy combatant"; significant new limitations on the scope of
the Freedom of Information Act; expanded authority to conduct
undercover infiltration and surveillance of political and religious
groups; increased power to wiretap, engage in electronic eavesdropping, and covertly review Internet and e-mail communications; new power secretly to review banking, brokerage, and
other financial records; and expanded authority to conduct clandestine physical searches (p 552) (internal citations omitted).
While Stone criticizes Congress and the public for the early, tooeasy, acceptance of questionable restrictions on civil rights, he expresses approval of the resistance to later proposed incursions: "Thus,
although the initial response of Congress and the public was to support the administration's demands for additional powers, once fears
had settled, the response was more clear-eyed and more resistant to
further expansions of executive authority" (p 554). Stone closes his
discussion (and the book) with a cautious appraisal: "And, so, we shall
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see" (p 557). The reader may reasonably wonder whether we have
indeed reached "the perfect ending."
I am more skeptical about progress, believing that we have not
experienced the same level of fear since the end of World War II and
further believing that human nature is more incorrigible in this area of
intolerance.
Still, even if Stone is right, there may be more we can do. I would
not say the answer lies in sharpening the test for the limits of free
speech, as some might (not Stone, however). Such sharpening has
been a primary focus of discussion over the last century as countless
formulations have been put forward, placed into service, abandoned
or modified, and then replaced by yet another linguistic turn. I do not
mean to say that this has been a useless fiddling with words while
speakers and free speech burned. Tests matter. But Stone is right: we
now have a test (Brandenburg) that, although still somewhat ambiguous, is about as speech-protective as we're going to get in the real
world.
Perhaps I should also say at this point that (for different reasons) little hope should be put in what we might call the rhetoric of
free speech. A claim that free speech is an "absolute" is either selfevidently preposterous or a meaningless tautology (the First Amendment protects absolutely all that the First Amendment protects). Indeed, this is exactly opposite the direction in which we should be
headed, for reasons I will offer in a moment.
What about the idea many have advanced over time of extending
the boundaries of protected speech so far out (even if not "absolutely") that it will be harder in times of stress to sacrifice the principle excessively? It is a fact that the United States protects speech significantly more than any other society in the world. 9 To be sure,
whether this effectively serves as a buffer in wartime is an intriguing
question in its own right, but, as a concept for improving protection in
the future, we are not going to expand protection from where it is
now.

Interestingly, I take Stone's focus in Perilous Times to be less on
First Amendment doctrine and more on understanding the psychology
19 See, for example, Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 1 (Foundation 1998)
("[N]owhere is the protection for free expression taken as far as in the United States."); Frederick Schauer, The FirstAmendment as Ideology, 33 Wm & Mary L Rev 853,856 (1992) (arguing in
part that "the degree of freedom of speech and press in the United States is substantially greater
than that prevailing in any other country on the face of the earth"); Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society 3 (Oxford 1986) (noting that the United States protects speech ranging from advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government to the endorsement of racial and religious
discrimination and that "[n]o other free society permits this kind of speech activity to nearly the
same degree").
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of censorship through historical investigation and on finding the extrajudicial means to moderate that bad impulse, inflamed as it is in times
of war. In the closing discussions of the book, Stone calls primarily for
education, for better-educated citizens and public officials (p 537).
He has some novel notions about having a "cooling off" period for
legislative restrictions on speech in wartime and about including sunset provisions in any legislation that emerges from this special process
(p 539-40). He further calls for a free speech advocate within the corridors of the White House, having shown how extremely important
presidential leadership is in determining how the whole society deals
with dissent (p 542). But what Stone knows-and undoubtedly what
compelled him to write this book after so many years of teaching and
writing about the First Amendment-is that self-knowledge is the
best, and perhaps even the only, antidote to the intolerant excesses he
meticulously recounts.
Perilous Times itself serves that fundamental educational purpose. It makes more visible and accessible, by concrete examples, the
evils of intolerance and the courage of resisting it. For a society better
educated on these issues, one can only hope that Perilous Times makes
Geoffrey Stone a rich man.
I would offer just a few final thoughts. Stone calls for more of a
temperament of self-doubt throughout society as a path to a better
balance of civil liberties in wartime. He asks for "a culture of civil liberties" (p 537):
Educational institutions, government agencies, political leaders,
foundations, the media, the legal profession, and civil liberties organizations all can help cultivate an environment in which citizens are more informed, open-minded, skeptical, critical of their
political leaders, tolerant of dissent, and protective of the freedoms of all individuals. Above all, as Judge Hand observed, the
"spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right""0
(p 537).
The idea of a beneficial relationship between self-doubt and
skepticism and tolerance of dissent has, of course, deep roots in our
traditions. While the remedy is helpful, it should not be regarded by
any means as a complete answer to the problem of the mentality of
intolerance. It is a hard fact of life, especially in a democracy, that one
of the most difficult and important capacities citizens must develop is
how to deal with the countless conflicts over differing beliefs (includLearned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in Irving Dillard, ed, The Spirit of Liberty: Papers
and Addresses of Learned Hand 189,190 (Knopf 1952).
20
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ing threats to those beliefs) that make up daily life in the public
sphere. Belief and doubt are not the only ingredients in our responses,
and each is appropriate in its own time.
Indeed, one key reason why excessive intolerance arises is because of a fear that the opposite evil may occur. In a society undergoing stress, it can sometimes happen that people lack the courage of
their moral convictions, through excessive doubt. They may become
befuddled by doubt when the proper call is to be resolute; or they may
try to free ride on others bearing the burdens of action. The tragedy of
the commons applies just as much to defending your principles as it
does to any shared physical space. And wars present collective action
problems in the psychological arena, too. To summon the will to fight
as a group, citizens naturally feel the need to demonstrate to each
other (and to themselves, in order to overcome their own self-doubts)
that they are in it together for the duration. This process of mutual
reassurance about the will to act when there are many incentives for
not acting can naturally lead people to use certitude as an expression
of will, which involves, in turn, a recalculation of the costs of and responses to deviance. Indeed, it is the recognition of this natural pattern of thinking in human behavior that undoubtedly leads to the idea
that freedom of speech must bend to some extent in times of war.
At the same time, it is simply not the case that embracing an attitude of skepticism or self-doubt ensures proper restraint in social conflict. One may recognize the possibility that one's beliefs are untrue
and yet unreasonably insist on having one's way, especially since by
this logic everyone's beliefs may be untrue. Crossing over from doubt
into commitment to one's belief is also a reasonable way to live, as
nearly everyone does, and behaving with appropriate self-restraint in
that state of mind is critically important today.
The simple and important facts are, first, that the intolerantmindedness that manifests itself in censorship of speech infects all
kinds of other behavior as well. It distorts judgment, leads to other
repressive laws, prevents reasonable compromise, and inflicts excessive punishments on those who violate social norms and are viewed as
threats to society. The stories of intolerance in Perilous Times are notably not limited to persecution of speakers.
And, second, there are no easily reducible rules or remedies for
regulating these excesses in all circumstances. The problem of the intolerant mind is a problem of self-government, not a plague that can
be cured by law.
But this is part of the source of the enormous power of the principle of freedom of speech as it has been developed in the United
States, over the past century especially. We now live in the most
speech-protective society in the world. What is so unusual about this
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country is not the security of the general right of free speech but
rather the scope of the right, the fact that so much speech that every
other democratic society regards as unacceptable and dangerous is
here tolerated.
In the United States, the social activity of speech has essentially
been removed from the normal area of democratic regulation. In the
realm of human behavior, it is the equivalent of protected and unregulated areas of wilderness. And, as such, freedom of speech has two
functions; it serves two democratic purposes. One is to provide extraordinary protection for the activity of speech itself as a means of
advancing our societal interest in public discussion of public issues.
The other is to create a part of the public arena where we can push
our capacities for tolerance as a way of better coming to terms with
the dangers of the mentality of intolerance that is so threatening to
the entire social fabric in the public sphere.
Perilous Times, to my mind, is a book that speaks powerfully and
factually to both of these dimensions of the modern idea of freedom
of speech. By focusing on free speech in times of war, which is typically when attitudes of intolerance run at their highest and the needs
of public debate for information and ideas are also greatest, Geoffrey
Stone teaches all of us about how speech in this country serves both
the practical interest in good discussions and the higher interest in
becoming better people and a better society.

